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THE MODIFICATION OF MULTILATERAL
CONVENTIONS BY MEANS OF
"NEGOTIATED RESERVATIONS" AND OTHER
"ALTERNATIVES": A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE ILO AND COUNCIL OF EUROPE-
PART ONEt
W. PAUL GORMLEY*
I. THEa CONTINUING NEED FOR RESERVATIONS
TIlE most perplexing problem of treaty law facing both regional andinternational organizations is that of securing universal acceptance
to their multilateral conventions by all members, for ratification can entail
agreement between the seventeen Members of the Council of Europe or
over one hundred states in the United Nations.' In a similar fashion, such
institutions as the Organization of American States and the International
Labour Organization face corresponding difficulties arising from the basic
requirements of maintaining the integrity of the treaty, but at the same
time allowing some degree of flexibility in regard to the legal commit-
ment assumed by a ratifying state. These two main interests must be
safeguarded, oftentimes by compromise. Still, the required number of
ratifications must be obtained in order that treaty texts may enter into
force. Unfortunately, no completely satisfactory solution has been found,
capable of protecting all of the above-mentioned factors, and it appears
that no future scheme of understandings, reservations, or alternative
flexibility devices will satisfy all conflicting interests.
The United Nations, through its International Law Commission, is con-
t The writer wishes to take this opportunity to sincerely thank those persons at the
International Labour Organization in Geneva, and at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg,
who so graciously gave valuable time and information, during the past three summers. As
requested, no personal acknowledgments are made; however, it is hoped that the con-
clusions reached do not deviate too far from actual practice. Accordingly, the writer assumes
full responsibility for all statements. Part Two of this article will appear in a subsequent
issue of this volume.
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa. Member of the District of
Columbia bar.
1. Anderson, Reservations To Multilateral Conventions: A Re-examination, 13 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 450 (1964). "The question of reservations to multilateral conventions--their
formulation and acceptance or rejection-has become since the Second World War one of
the most controversial issues in the law of treaties, and, of all the many problems in inter-
national law today, it is one of those most urgently in need of clarification and codification.'
Id. Accord, Comment, The Problem of Reservations in Multilateral Conventions, 30 Albany
L. Rev. 100 (1966).
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tinuing to devote considerable effort in its attempts to finally determine
the international law standard governing reservations to treaties, includ-
ing the very interesting related problems of understandings and declara-
tions, 2 in light of the 1951 judgment in the Genocide Case.8 This verdict
in fact changed the traditional standard of international law as pro-
mulgated by the League of Nations under which absolutely no reservation
could be attached at signature, at ratification, or at a subsequent date
without the consent of all other parties.4 While it is not the primary aim
of this paper to examine the international law criterion of unanimity as it
is presently being modified by the International Law Commission' and
the American Law Institute,6 the writer believes it is essential to recognize
that the doctrine in this area is far from settled. Moreover, the law of
reservations will remain in a condition of uncertainty for some time,
2. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifteenth Session
(Agenda Item 69), U.N. Jurid. Y.B. at 58 ST/LEG/SER.C/1 (1963). See note 7 Infra. See
also [1962] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 139, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/1441 (1962). Specifically,
notice the action by the ILC on Waldoeck's Draft at the Fifteenth Session held at Geneva
from 6 May to 12 July 1963, 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/156.1-3. Annual
Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1963-15 June
1964, 19 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 1, at 126, U.N. Doc. A/5801 (1964).
3. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. 15;
Bishop, Judicial Decisions, 45 Am. J. Int'l L. 579 (1951). "The object and purpose of the
Genocide Convention imply that it was the intention of the General Assembly and of the
States which adopted it that as many States as possible should participate. The complete ex-
clusion from the Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of Its
application, but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles
which are its basis. It is inconceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that
an objection to a minor reservation should produce such a result .... It follows that It is the
compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must fur-
nish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as
for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation. Such is the rule of conduct which
must guide every State in the appraisal which it must make, individually and from its own
standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation." [1951] I.C.J. at 24; Bishop, supra at
584-85.
4. Professor William W. Bishop, Jr., in his 1965 Hague Academy of International Law
lectures, took the position that the International Court of Justice in the 1951 Genocide Case
moved closer to the Pan American practice for the reason that the key phrase In the
decision is "compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention." Bishop, The
General Course of Public International Law, 115 Recueil des Cours 147, 350 (1965 II).
In his second series of lectures before The Hague Academy more emphasis was placed on
the OAS criteria. Earlier, some writers had recognized the value in the Pan American norm.
E.g., Meek, International Law: Reservations to Multilateral Agreements, 5 Do Paul L. Rev.
40, 73-74 (1955). Cf. note 5 infra.
5. Bishop, Reservations To Treaties, 103 Recueil des Cours 245 (1961 II); Fitzmaurlce,
Reservations To Multilateral Conventions, 2 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 1 (1953).
6. Restatement of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 127-32 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter cited as Restatement].
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largely because this phase of treaty law is growing not only within the
United Nations7 but, correspondingly, within major regional groupings,
especially the Organization of American States.'
Previously, the writer has taken the position that the Pan American
practice of permitting an unlimited right to attach reservations even in the
face of objection from other ratifying states has become the correct inter-
national norm in actual practice as a result of the Genocide Case.' Though
recognizing this position represents a viewpoint considerably beyond the
essential object and purpose test enunciated by the International Court of
Justice,10 there is some support for such conclusions because of an in-
creasing use of reservations at both the regional and international levels.1
Despite severe criticism of the OAS standard,' the writer submits that
the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission
have rejected the traditional norm prohibiting the attachment of reserva-
tions to multilateral conventions unless all other states specifically agreed
in advance to accept the reservation. Under this older view, the reserving
state could not ratify in the face of objection by any other party. Thus,
every state could exercise a veto if it so desired.
7. The International Law Commission is continuing its work on this topic. The Seven-
teenth Session of the International Law Commission convened on May 3, 1965 in Geneva.
See Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1964-
15 June 1965, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 1, at 154, U.N. Doc. A/6001 (1965).
8. 4 M. Hudson, International Legislation 2381 (1931); C. Jenks, The International Pro-
tection of Trade Union Freedom 542 (1957); Written Statement of the Organization of
American States, International Court of Justice; Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents,
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide 15, 17 (1951) [hereinafter cited as ICJ Pleadings].
9. Gormley, The Influence of the United States and the Organization of American
States On the International Law of Reservations, 7 Inter-Am. L. Rev. 127 (1965); accord,
A. McNair, The Law of Treaties 167 (rev. ed. 1961) where he states: "(H]aving regard to the
origins and special characteristics of the Convention, the court found that the States responsible
for the negotiation of this Convention were deemed to have authorized the making of
'compatible' reservations and to have accepted in advance their validity without the
necessity of their being submitted to all the parties for their assent." (Footnote omitted.)
10. The ICJ enumerated the basic requirement in the Genocide Case as follows: "The
object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of making reservations
and that of objecting to them. It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with
the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude
of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State
in objecting to the reservation." [1951] I.C.J. at 24; Bishop, supra note 3, at 584-8S.
11. Bishop, supra note 4, at 348-52.
12. The system proposed by the Commission is very close to the Pan American system
which has not proved very successful. Fitzmaurice has demonstrated fairly convincingly that
the Pan American system does not even work very satisfactorily in its own field, and it
is less likely therefore that it would have any more success in a global field. Fitzmaurice,
supra note 5, at 20-22.
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Regardless of the position taken toward the use of reservations to
multilateral conventions at the international level, islands of specialized
practice have developed in both the international and regional spheres
which reject both the unanimity principle and the unlimited right of
reservation. Interestingly, the same problems must be resolved, namely,
the preservation of the essential integrity (object and purpose) of the
multilateral convention as opposed to the need to obtain the maximum
number of ratifications or at the very least the minimum number required
to bring the instrument into force. As brought out very forcefully in the
Genocide Case, some conventions cannot enter into force if too high a
standard of compliance is imposed. As will be shown in this study, similar
difficulties have been resolved by the International Labour Organization
at the global level and the seventeen-member Council of Europe in the
regional area, but different legal criteria have evolved.
Although the special techniques developed within the ILO and Council
of Europe will not be adopted by the world community, it is possible that
some help, or at least insight, may be gained from an examination of the
unique procedures used by these two organizations for the reason that the
negotiated reservation represents a standard that is very close to the
criteria set forth by the International Court of Justice in the Genocide
Case. In effect, the fundamental dilemma of maintaining the integrity of
the negotiated text, while at the same time enabling as many states to
ratify the convention as possible, has been squarely faced by these two
institutions, and new workable solutions have been found. Moreover, the
practice originally begun by ILO (and limited to use by that organiza-
tion) has already served as a starting point for the Council of Europe,
which in turn will have an impact on other newly developing organiza-
tions. Hence, this new phase of treaty law may have some influence on
other regions.13 At least, it should be considered to constitute a significant
part of modern law being created by the growing regional movement.
The most significant single factor is that the signatories determine in
advance those reservations and alternatives to reservations that will be
permitted and are, therefore, deemed to be in conformity with the object
and purpose of the convention.
Originally, the Council of Europe intended to adhere to the traditional
norm by completely prohibiting all reservations on the theory that a
limited number of homogeneous states could resolve all major difficulties
13. A. Robertson, Human Rights In Europe 171-78 (1963); Golsong, Implementation
of International Protection of Human Rights, 110 Recuell des Cours 1 (1963 III); Gormley,
The Procedural Status of the Individual Before Supranational Judicial Tribunals, 41 U. Det.
L.J. 282, 288-92 (1964); Robertson, Legal Problems of European Integration, 91 RecueUl
des Cours 104 (1957 I).
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during the process of negotiation, for it was felt that like-minded Euro-
pean governments would not encounter the diverse conflicts arising in the
larger United Nations and Pan American Union. As a result of difficulties
subsequently encountered in the various attempts to unify Europe at
the political level, a series of compromises became necessary.14 In fact,
the very existence of the Council is based on the notion of compromise.
Thus, it became apparent that a "European law of reservations" suitable
to the special problems facing the Council was required, rather than the
mere adoption of the International, or Pan American, or even ILO pro-
cedures. Nevertheless, it should not be implied that the Council has not
benefited from the experience of other institutions. Instead, the seventeen-
member political group has profited greatly from the utilization of
flexibility devices originally formulated by the ILO, a world-wide legal
unit which, in theory, firmly prohibits the use of any and all reserva-
tions.' 5 Realistically, the negotiated reservation represents an evolution
from ILO's more limited flexibility device, deemed to constitute an alter-
native to reservations rather than a true reservation.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Against the general hypothesis set forth above, the specific purpose
of this study is first, to examine the use of the flexibility device as an
alternative (to the typical reservation) originally developed by ILO but
later adopted by the Council; and secondly, to trace the evolution of the
negotiated reservation subsequently emerging in the Council of Europe,
which grew out of earlier concepts. This "specialized reservation" adheres
closely to the criteria set forth by the International Court of Justice in the
Genocide Case, since the essential integrity of the treaty is preserved.
These islands of specialized practice, rejecting the traditional norms, the
criteria of the International Law Commission, and the liberal Pan
American stand, will continue to govern not only treaty relationships be-
tween Member States but also additional international institutions, such as
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Admittedly, it is a bit premature to formulate conclusions as to the future
growth of regional treaty law. Nonetheless, a significant beginning has
been made, worthy of serious examination.
III. PROBLEM OF DEFINING "RESERVATION"
Considerable difficulty is experienced in defining precisely what type of
statement will constitute a full reservation as contrasted with an under-
14. A. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe 1-14 (1963); A. Robertson, The Council of
Europe 1-9 (2d ed. 1961); A. Robertson, The Law of International Institutions in Europe
11-26, 38-41 (1961).
15. Bishop, supra note 5, at 326. See also note 20 infra.
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standing or declaration short of a reservation. Further, some of the treaty
texts examined below could be held to constitute either an integral part of
the text or in other cases an amendment. Admittedly, considerable dispute
can arise over such points of interpretation. Numerous attempts have
been made to arrive at a very precise definition." Article 13 of The
Harvard Research in International Law defines a reservation as "a formal
declaration by which a State. . .specifies as a condition of its willingness
to become a party to the treaty certain terms which will limit the effect of
the treaty insofar as it may apply in the relations of that State with the
other State or States which may be parties to the treaty."'17 The essential
element in a reservation is that a change in the legal effects of the treaty re-
sults. Likewise, the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States uses the terms "changing or stating more precisely the legal
effect of the agreement.' 8
For the purpose of this study it will be necessary to adopt a relatively
broad concept of reservation so as to include treaty articles, short of
amendments, permitting states to vary the force of their ratifications.
Admittedly, a narrower definition 0 of "reservation" would limit the scope
of the study, perhaps on the theory that escape clauses and flexibility
devices are an integral part of the treaty and, therefore, differ from uni-
lateral statements. Conversely, the writer wishes, for the purpose of an-
alysis, to include all devices the application of which permit a state to be-
come a party to a multilateral convention without immediately assuming
all of the maximum obligations set forth in the text. To the degree that a
state can deviate from the legal effects of a treaty, a reservation has in
fact been permitted. The significant factor, insofar as the ILO and Coun-
16. The very interesting problem cannot be fully explored here. See the numerous defini-
tions in 5 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law § 482 (1943) ; Anderson, supra note 1,
at 450-54; Bishop, supra note 5, at 249-52; Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions,
7 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 141 (1926). See also the definition of a reservation set forth in art. 2(l)
(d) of the Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, U.N. Doec. A/Conf. 39/27, 8
Int'l Legal Materials 679, 681 (1969).
17. Harvard Research in International Law, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 653, 843 (Supp. 1935)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research]. Similar language is contained In
Restatement § 127, comment a at 465.
18. See Restatement §§ 127 & 130.
19. E.g., Anderson presents a very restricted definition to fit his proposed collegiate
system, permitting some reservations to which a majority of states do not object. He would
exclude a "unilateral statement" from the definition of reservation. Anderson feels that
"[t]he unilateral statement is a proposed reservation; the eventual provision to which the
other parties, or at any rate a majority of them, agree is the actual reservation." Anderson,
supra note 1, at 452.
Likewise, an examination of understandings and interpretative declarations cannot be
undertaken here; it merely needs to be noted that such statements do not modify the termts
of the treaty as do reservations. See Bishop, supra note 5, at 303-22; Restatement § 127,
comment c at 465-67.
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cil of Europe are concerned, is that the negotiating states have determined
beforehand those articles subject to modification and, correspondingly,
those absolutely essential to the object and purpose of the treaty and,
therefore, incapable of modification.
The writer will concede that others might properly desire a different
classification of such internal portions of treaty texts, previously agreed
to by all concerned. However, he believes the legal effect of flexibility
devices and negotiated reservations rather than mere classification is the
vital consideration. In this study emphasis will be placed on the modifica-
tion and variation of treaty obligations within these two islands of
specialized law, one at the international level and the other within the
regional sphere. As will be indicated below, the ILO and Council of
Europe have formulated alternatives to the reserving practice found in
traditional international law. Nevertheless, similar-type problems are
resolved, especially the need to protect the integrity of the essential ob-
ject and purpose of the treaty while simultaneously allowing the maxi-
mum number of states to become parties, though they are unable to
assume full obligations. In short, compromise before signature results in
some accommodation to both essential interests. Since the traditional
reservation could not be employed to achieve this objective, it was abso-
lutely essential that some other scheme be chosen.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION
The oldest world-wide specialized agency, originally affiliated with the
League of Nations, has in theory been the staunchest advocate of the
absolute integrity of the Convention as negotiated and finally adopted.
Repeatedly, its Director-General has taken the position that absolutely
no reservations of any type will be permitted. The result is that a state
is forced to make a choice; either the entire package of obligations must
be accepted or the state will not be permitted to ratify. This basic propo-
sition of refusing to recognize any reservations is as old as ILO itselfL
20. Jenks, supra note 8, at 542-47; McNair, supra note 9, at 173; Bishop, supra note 5, at
305-06. The primary sources consist of two memoranda. The first is: Admissibility of
Reservations to General Conventions, Memorandum By the Director of the International
Labour Office, 8 League of Nations Off. J. 882 (1927). This Memorandum was submitted to
the Council of the League on June 15, 1927 [hereinafter cited as Memo to League]. The
second, and by far the more important is: Written Statement of the International Labour
Organization, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, ICJ Pleadings, Oral Arguments, and Documents at 216 (1951) [herein-
after cited as Memo]. See also Memo, app. I at 237; Memo, app. I at 237; Memo, app.
IV at 257. "The principle that reservations to ratifications of international labour conventions
are not admissble was first formulated by the International Labour Office in 1920, has been
repeatedly reaffirmed since that time, and has been generally accepted by the Members of
the International Labour Organization." Memo, para. 19, at 228.
19701
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The main reason for the firm stand of ILO lies in the fact that its Con-
ventions do not affect Member Governments exclusively but also private
labour and management groups. Unilateral variations from the minimum
obligations contained in its Conventions would defeat the organization's
objective, which is to establish definite minimum standards of labour
and human rights protection, at a level below which a state cannot deviate
and still remain a party to the Convention even though the concurrence
of all other signatories is obtained. Not only does ILO deal with non-
governmental entities, it is actually composed of private delegates from
labour and management along with governmental representatives.21 Thus,
the unique character of ILO results from its tripartite structure.0 Be-
cause of its special function, the protection of labour and management at
the global level, the traditional type of reservation has repeatedly been
rejected in a long line of decisions from the Director-General.' That is to
say, the basic function of ILO Conventions is to serve as instruments
facilitating the establishment of a world-wide network of minimum labour
standards, incorporating far more than governmental interests. Therefore,
states cannot be permitted to hamper the total system by unilateral de-
viations, since the obligations assumed must be based on reciprocity. As
was maintained by the Director of the International Labour Office in
1927:
If reservations made on the occasion of ratification were accepted, a legal deadlock
would inevitably be reached; every State would thus be contracting engagements of
varying scope according to the significance of its reservations. This argument may be
applied in a general way to all collective treaties; but, in the case of international
labour conventions, it has a special importance, on which stress must be laid. The ob-
ject of the International Labour Organisation is to safeguard conditions of labour
against the detrimental influence of international competition; and this is the reason
why international labour conventions must establish a network of mutual obligations
among the various States. It is essential that exact reciprocity should be preserved in
these obligations, and to that end the Peace Treaties establish an extremely detailed
procedure for the enforcement of the conventions. It is perfectly obvious that the ad-
mission of reservations on the occasion of ratification would soon destroy the practical
value of the international engagements in question and upset the balance which it is
the object of the conventions to establish as regards industrial competition. The pro-
cedure of enforcement would become inoperative, and the entire system of the In-
ternational Labour Organisation would collapse.24
In short, the unique nature and purpose of its Conventions is the basic
21. Gormley, The Emerging Protection of Human Rights by the International Labour
Organization, 30 Albany L. Rev. 13, 20-22, 24-25 (1966).
22. For a discussion of the tripartite structure see C. Jenks, The Common Law of Man-
kind (1958) and Jenks, The Significance for International Law of the Tripartite Character
of the International Labour Organisation, 22 Trans. Grotius Soc. 45 (1937).
23. Memo to League 883-84. See sources cited in notes 20-21 supra.
24. Memo to League 883-84.
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reason for prohibiting reservations. The texts are not drafted and signed
by governments but are drawn up by the International Labour Confer-
ence. Because of the tripartite character of the drafting body, these Con-
ventions are not typical treaties. Instead, they relate to, and draw
authority from, the ILO Constitution. As such, these texts are brought
into being by a two-thirds vote of the Conference, composed of delegates
representing "interests" rather than states.s In effect, "[t ] he adoption of
a draft convention by a two-thirds majority of the Conference may thus
be said to take the place of the traditional formality of signature."2
Accordingly, ILO Conventions represent much more than contractual
obligations among Members.
In addition to statements of policy sent to the Council of the League of
Nations and the International Court of Justice, the International Labour
Office has had repeated occasion to refuse recognition of proposed reser-
vations such as those suggested by Poland in 1920, India in 1921, Cuba
in 1928, and Peru in 1936.7 In each instance the reservation was either
withdrawn or the state was unable to ratify the Convention.
A. Alterna2ives To Reservations
In view of the fact that reservations would not be recognized, it be-
came necessary for alternatives to be developed in order that some na-
tions, unable at first to adopt higher-type European labour standards,
could become parties and temporarily accept certain minimum obliga-
tions. The advantage of allowing the adoption of such lower legal duties
is that at least a bare minimum of labour and human rights protection is
obtained at the outset, with the hope that as the nation's resources de-
velop the higher criteria will subsequently be adopted. Such flexibility
25. "Perhaps, however, they [ILO Conventions] might be more accurately defined as
'treaties of accession.' They appear to be legal instruments partaking of the nature both
of a law and of a contract. They have a contractual character in the sense that they are
mutually binding only upon those states which have of their own free will ratified them;
and they have a legislative character in the sense that they are produced by a special
authority which fixes a sole and universal text. While free to adhere or refrain from adher-
ing, the contracting parties cannot impair the force of these general instruments by means
of special conventions or declarations." Id. at 883.
26. Id. at 882. "These agreements are not drawn up by the Contracting States in accord-
ance with their own ideas; they are not the work of plenipotentiaries, but of a conference
which has a peculiar legal character and includes non-Government representatives. Reserva-
tions would still be- inadmissible, even if all the States interested accepted them; for the
rights which the treaties have conferred on non-Governmental interests in regard to the
adoption of international labour conventions would be overruled if the conscent of the Gov-
ernments alone could suffice to modify the substance and detract from the effect of the




devices, permitting the ratification of only minimum portions of certain
conventions, plus escalation clauses allowing a later raising of minimums,
is assured under the ILO Constitution. "In framing any Convention or
Recommendation of general application the Conference shall have due
regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect de-
velopment of industrial organisation, or other special circumstances make
the industrial conditions substantially different and shall suggest the
modifications, if any, which it considers may be required to meet the case
of such countries."2 8 Likewise, other paragraphs, namely 7(a), (b) (i)-
(iii), and 8, deal with degrees of flexibility permitted in the adoption
process."
Despite these provisions designed to deal with certain special cases, as
augmented by other regional arrangements,80 ILO will not retreat from its
basic position, namely that these flexibility devices are not reservations.
The writer, nevertheless, submits that the practical result of such alter-
natives has an effect similar to reservations.8' Therefore, the more profit-
able approach would seem to be a recognition of alternatives to reserva-
tions, which do in fact effect a change in the obligations set forth in a
Convention, though a certain basic minimum is assured. Indeed, the major
difference between alternatives to typical reservations and the newer
negotiated reservation of the Council of Europe may be one of philosophy
or intent (or even semantics) rather than the result achieved. Admittedly,
this premise may be incapable of easy solution at the theoretical level.
B. Flexibility In Practice
Though the term "flexibility" is not employed in the IO Memoranda
to the International Court of Justice, the concept is very clear in applica-
tion.3 2 Nevertheless, in practice considerable variations exist as to the
28. ILO Const. art. 19(3).
29. See 1 International Labour Code (1951). In the Preface, at LXXV-VI, the point Is
made that the ratification of a Convention or Recommendation will not repeal a higher
national standard. The fact that the ILO Conventions constitute only minimum standards
was clearly established in 1946 by the Conference Delegation on Constitutional Questions.
The Council of Europe has adopted a similar position.
30. E.g., 2 id. at 725-46, appendix V, pt. I, Asian Regional Supplement, The "Modifica-
tion" of the Provisions of Conventions In Respect of Asian Countries In Virtue of Article
19(3) of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation. Article 19(3) has been
used primarily by the Asian countries.
31. Memo, para. 14, at 224 contains numerous examples of Conventions with optional
provisions, enabling the state in question to adopt the lower standards. Regretfully, these
numerous examples of treaty articles in the Memo cannot be recounted here; consequently,
only appropriate references to paragraphs, along with selected examples, will be provided.
The Memo should be consulted for additional documentation.
32. Id.
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types of special provisions chosen in order to give effect to constitutional
powers, especially Article 19. For the purpose of exposition, it is possible
(even though open to some question) to group the one hundred-thirty
ILO Conventions under five general headings. Admittedly, considerable
overlapping, plus over simplification, necessarily results from such a sur-
vey. It should be noted that the following general classifications will sub-
sequently be used as a starting point for an analysis of the Conventions
promulgated by the Council of Europe.
1. Exceptions
The simplest alternative to formal reservations consists of articles or
paragraphs inserted into the main body of the treaty, signifying that
ratifying states may exclude certain provisions if they so desire. Under
this device, which the writer believes has the same practical effect as a
negotiated reservation, the designated portions of the Convention can be
rendered inapplicable. For example, Article 3 of the Convention Con-
cerning Benefits in the Case of Employment Injury33 incorporates a long
list of classifications capable of exclusion at the time of ratification.34
2. National Legislation
An alternative very similar to the exception often consists of a na-
tionality test. In this situation, general aims are set forth in the Conven-
tion, but the precise standards are determined by national legislation.
Realistically, in many technical areas exact criteria cannot be promul-
gated by international regulations. To illustrate, Article 2 of the Con-
vention Concerning Employment Policy holds:
Each Member shall, by such methods and to such extent as may be appropriate under
national conditions-
(a) decide on and keep under review, within the framework of a co-ordinated economic
and social policy, the measures to be adopted for attaining the objectives specified
in Article 1. 5
33. No. 121 (1964), 602 U.N.T.S. 259.
34. ". Any Member which ratifies this Convention may, by a declaration accompanying
its ratification, exclude from the application of the Convention-
(a) seafarers, including seafishermen,
(b) public servants, where these categories are protected by special schemes which
provide in the aggregate benefits at least equivalent to those required by this Convention.
2. Where a declaration under paragraph 1 of this Article is in force, the Member may
exclude the persons belonging to the category or categories excluded from the application of
the Convention from the number of employees when calculating the percentage of employees
in compliance with paragraph 2, clause (d), of Article 4, and with Article 5' Id. art. 3, para.
3 contains a typical escalation clause permitting the subsequent adoption of higher standards.
The Council of Europe follows this practice. See art. S of the Recommendation Concerning
-Medical Care and Sickness Benefits, No. 134 (1969).
35. No. 122 (1964), 569 U.N.T.S. 6S.
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Similarly, Article 3 of the Convention Concerning Medical Examination
of Young Persons for Fitness for Employment Underground in Mines
provides: "National laws or regulations shall define the persons respon-
sible for compliance with the provisions of this Convention.!" The result
is that a lower-or differing-standard may be applied depending on the
condition of local law. Hence, such provisions (oftentimes accompanied
by understandings, as pointed out below) do not produce the same stan-
dard in every country. Consequently, it is highly possible that the degree
of variation may even preclude the establishment of a global minimum.
However, the value of clearly stated ideals should not be underrated
since world attention is directed toward any internal deficiencies. Ac-
cordingly, these criteria are implemented by reporting devices.
3. Territorial Application
A specialized type of exception is authorized pursuant to Article 35 of
the Constitution in that governing powers may exclude non-metropolitan
territories, including trust territories, in those instances in which "the
Convention is inapplicable owing to the local conditions or subject to such
modifications as may be necessary to adapt the Convention to local con-
ditions." 37 Very frequently both the ILO and Council of Europe have
inserted similar articles enabling governments to limit their acceptance
strictly to the Mother Country. Sadly, the frequency of such modifica-
tions must be conceded.
4. Optional or Alternative Provisions
The ILO Memorandum submitted to the International Court of Justice
contains numerous examples by which states may adopt certain op-
tional3 8 or even alternative parts, 9 rather than assuming all of the higher
36. No. 124 (1965), 614 U.N.T.S. 239. See Recommendation Concerning the Vocational
Training of Fishermen, No. 126 pt. III, art. 11(l) (1966) for another example of precise
standards to be set by national legislation.
37. ILO Const. art. 35. It contains more specific provisions relative to excluded territories.
Accord, id. art. 19(3) relating to local conditions. "The obligation to apply ratified conven-
tions to non-metropolitan territories is a qualified one under the terms of the Constitution
itself which provides (Article 35 (1) and (2)) for the communication to the Director-General
of declarations stating the extent to which the Member undertakes that the provisions of
the convention will be applied to non-metropolitan territories and giving such particulars as
may be prescribed by the convention. The particulars prescribed by the individual conven-
tions include particulars of the modifications subject to which the convention will be applied
to the various non-metropolitan territories." Memo, para. 23, at 232-33.
38. E.g., Convention Concerning Statistics of Wages and Hours of Work In the Principal
Mining and Manufacturing Industries, Including Building and Construction, and in Agricul-
ture, No. 63 (1938), 40 U.N.T.S. 255.
39. See discussion in Memo, para. 23, at 232-34 and the numerous examples Included
therein.
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standards. In a sense these options represent an early stage, and at the
present time a middle ground, between the simple exception and the fully-
developed escalation clause, which oftentimes encompasses an elaborate
set of escalation clauses. In any event, these optional and alternative
articles represent an advancement over the single exception, in that a
higher level of labour protection may be assumed at a later date. In ad-
dition, the state has much more choice as to the type of obligation to be
assumed. On the other hand, the Council of Europe is using the option
concept to give greater variation to its reservations.
5. Flexibility Devices
Recent Conventions have tended to make more extensive use of the
escalation concept, which the writer believes is the most significant con-
tribution made by ILO to the science of treaty law. Actually, the major
advancement in this field has taken place since World War II, though
early traces can be found in the inter-war period.40 In a manner similar
to the later Council of Europe, the ILO pioneered the practice of first ob-
taining acceptance of essential articles and at subsequent dates working
toward the adoption of an enumerated series of higher obligations by
utilizing available reporting devices supported by the sanction of pub-
licity.l Under such practice, excluded sections, alternative provisions,
and especially "colonial clauses" are subsequently removed. Similarly,
national legislation is raised to meet international norms. This procedure,
resulting in the adoption of higher standards, can be traced through a
series of recent Conventions. On the other hand, participating states are
accorded a great deal of choice as to the various provisions they may
exclude. The result is that a maximum degree of participation is assured,
and conflict, similar to that present in the Genocide Case, is avoided,
since the desired escape valve has already been agreed upon by the
International Labour Conference.
In the previously cited Convention Concerning Benefits in the Case of
40. See id. for examples of escalation clauses, especially as they apply to non-metropolitan
territories.
41. The very significant sanction of reporting devices and inspections of labour conditions
within the Member States cannot be dealt with here. See C. Alexandrolicz, World Economic
Agencies: Law and Practice (1962) ; C. Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication
663-726 (1964) ; Gormley, supra note 21, at 33-35; Gormley, The Status of the Awards of
International Tribunals: Possible Avoidance Versus Legal Enforcement, 10 How. L.J. 33, 62,
69 (1964).
Saba speaks of the "world sense of shame" as the means by which compliance is obtained
as to Conventions and Recommendations of ILO. Saba, Quasi-Legislative Activities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, 111 Recueil des Cours 603 (1964 I). Realistically,
the reporting devices are the main reason causing the Member States to adopt higher
standards. Gormley, supra note 21, at 46-49.
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Employment Injury, Article 3 (3) was noted.' By way of further example,
the Convention Concerning Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-
Nationals in Social Security includes an escalation clause pursuant to
which additional classes of benefits can be adopted. Such optional appli-
cation permits a state to guarantee additional benefits. However, once
accepted, they generally cannot be removed or a lower criterion applied.44
A few exceptions permitting rescission will be noted below. Moreover,
through bilateral agreements Member States may promulgate higher
standards of variations to more adequately meet local conditions. 5 The
Council of Europe has also found this technique to be extremely valuable.
In the Convention Concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security"
the escalation clause becomes very clear in that the essential portions,
which must be ratified along with some optional provisions, are clearly
set forth in Articles 2-4 as follows:
Article 2
Each Member for which this Convention is in force-
(a) shall comply with-
(i) Part I;
(ii) at least three of Parts II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX and X, including at least
one of Parts IV, V, VI, IX and X;
(iii) the relevant provisions of Parts XI, XII and XIII; and
42. See note 34 supra.
43. No. 118 (1962), 494 U.N.T.S. 271 [hereinafter cited as Convention Concerning Equality
of Treatment of Nationals]. Article 2(1) of this Convention provides:
"1. Each Member may accept the obligations of this Convention in respect of any one
or more of the following branches of social security for which it has in effective operation







(g) employment injury benefit;
(h) unemployment benefit; and
(i) family benefit."
44. Id. art. 2(4) which states:
"Each Member which has ratified this Convention may subsequently notify the Director-
General of the International Labour Office that it accepts the obligations of the Convention
in respect of one or more branches of social security not already specified in its ratification."
45. Id. art. 9 states: "The provisions of this Convention may be derogated from by
agreements between Members which do not affect the rights and duties of other Members
and which make provisions for the maintenance of rights in course of acquisition and of
acquired rights under conditions at least as favourable on the whole as those provided for
in this Convention." See also id. art. 12(1).
46. No. 102 (1952), 210 U.N.T.S. 131 [hereinafter cited as Minimum Standards Con-
vention].
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(iv) Part XIV; and
(b) shall specify in its ratification in respect of which of Parts II to X it accepts the
obligations of the Convention.
Article 3
1. A Member whose economy and medical facilities are insufficiently developed may,
if and for so long as the competent authority considers necessary, avail itself, by
a declaration appended to its ratification, of the temporary exceptions provided
for in the following Articles: 9(d); 12(2); 15(d); 18(2); 21(c); 27(d); 33(b);
34(3); 41(d); 48(c); 55(d) and 61(d).
2. Each Member which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 of this Article shall
include in the annual report upon the application of this Convention submitted
under Article 22 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation a
statement, in respect of each exception of which it avails itsdf-
(a) that its reason for doing so subsists; or
(b) that it renounces its right to avail itself of the exception in question as from
a stated date.
Article 4
1. Each Member which has ratified this Convention may subsequently notify the
Director-General of the International Labour Office that it accepts the obligations
of the Convention in respect of one or more of Parts II to X not already specified
in its ratification.
2. The undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be deemed to be
an integral part of the ratification and to have the force of ratification as from the
date of notification. 47
The writer submits that the Minimum Standards Convention repre-
sents the best example of true flexibility devices, because even a lower
standard may subsequently be adopted.48 Nevertheless, other recent
47. Id. arts. 2-4. See art. 80 which, in conformity with arL 35(2) of the ILO Const,
permits modification of the basic agreement insofar as the territories covered are concerned.
Article 80(3) states: "Any Member may at any time by a subsequent declaration cancel in
whole or in part any reservation made in its original declaration in virtue of subparagraphs
(b), (c) or (d) of paragraph 1 of this Article." Query: does this Article recognize reserva-
tions, regardless of the stand taken by the Secretary-General?
48. Article 82 of the Minimum Standards Convention represents a very unusual ILO
practice in that it allows a subsequent denunciation of portions of the Convention. Paragraph
1 maintains: "A Member which has ratified this Convention may, after the expiration of
ten years from the date on which the Convention first comes into force, denounce the Con-
vention or any one or more of Parts II to X . . . ." See also id. art. 82(2). In this regard,
the modifications permitted under art. 80(1) should be noted:
"1. Declarations communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour
Office in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 35 of the Constitution of the International
Labour Organisation shall indicate-
(a) the territories in respect of which the Member concerned undertakes that the pro-
visions of the Convention or of any Parts thereof shall be applied without modification;
(b) the territories in respect of which it undertakes that the provisions of the Convention
or of any Parts thereof shall be applied subject to modifications, together with details of
the said modifications;
(c) the territories in respect of which the Convention is inapplicable and in such cases
the ground on which it is inapplicable;
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Conventions have incorporated similar features. To illustrate, the 1965
Convention Concerning the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
Underground in Mines"' contains an escalation clause enabling a higher
minimum age to be specified. 50 Likewise, the Convention Concerning
Maternity Protection 5' sets forth numerous categories of exceptions in
Article 7 (1). But Article 7 (2) maintains: "The categories of occupations
or undertakings in respect of which the Member proposes to have re-
course to the provisions of paragraph 1 . . . shall be specified in the
declaration accompanying its ratification.'5 2 As previously noted,55 cer-
tain articles permit removal of such exceptions. Article 7 (3) holds: "Any
Member which has made such a declaration may at any time cancel that
declaration, in whole or in part, by a subsequent declaration," whereas
Article 10 deals with subsequent modifications as to non-metropolitan
territories." The later Convention Concerning Wages, Hours of Work on
Board Ship and Manning,55 accomplishes a similar objective under the
provisions in Article 5.11 Interestingly, an even more flexible technique,
(d) the territories in respect of which it reserves its decision pending further consideration
of the position."
49. No. 123 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Convention Concerning Minimum Age in Mines).
50. The international minimum age of sixteen is contained in id. art. 2. Article 3 specifies
the higher option as follows: "Each Member which has ratified this Convention may
subsequently notify the Director-General . . . by a further declaration, that it specifies a
minimum age higher than that specified at the time of ratification."
51. No. 103 (1952), 214 U.N.T.S. 321 (Revised 1952).
52. Id. art. 7(2) (emphasis added).
53. See notes 34 & 48 supra. The Council of Europe has adopted a similar practice.
54. Article 10(1)(b)-(d) of the Convention Concerning Maternity Protection provides
that declarations communicated to the Director-General must indicate:
"(b) the territories in respect of which it undertakes that the provisions of the Con-
vention shall be applied subject to modifications, together with details of the said modifica-
tions;
(c) the territories in respect of which the Convention is inapplicable and in such cases
the grounds on which it is inapplicable;
(d) the territories in respect of which it reserves its decision pending further consideration
of the position."
A higher standard may be adopted pursuant to paragraph 3 of art. 10 which provides:
"Any Member may at any time by a subsequent declaration cancel In whole or in part any
reservation made in its original declaration in virtue of subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d) of
paragraph 1 of this Article." Accord, id. art. 7(3). Article 10 must be read in connection
with art. 11(1) and (2) of the same convention.
55. No. 109 (Revised 1958) [hereinafter cited as Convention Concerning Wages on
Board Ship].
56. Id. art. 5 states:
"1. Each Member ratifying this Convention may, by a declaration appended to Its
ratification, exclude from its ratification Part II of the Convention.
2. Subject to the terms of any such declaration, the provisions of Part II of the Con-
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permitting a very low standard of compliance, is set forth in Article 5(5)
in that the optional items may be accepted as a recommendation. "While
a declaration made under paragraph 1 of this Article remains in force in
respect of Part II, the Member may declare its willingness to accept Part
II as having the force of a Recommendation."5
C. Continued Use of Alternatives
Additional recent Conventions could be cited to illustrate the various
flexibility devices, especially the vital escalation clauses, presently in
use." Obviously, the over one hundred and twenty-five Conventions can-
not be discussed in minute detail within the scope of a comparative study
of this type. However, from the selected Conventions analyzed above, in
connection with the earlier data set forth in the two memoranda prepared
for the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice," cer-
tain observations, or more correctly, unresolved problems emerge, pri-
marily because: 1) some of the above cited Articles appear to have the
same effect as reservations; 60 2) provision is made for unilateral declara-
tions at the time of ratification, excluding certain provisions and terri-
tories to which the texts shall be in force;6" and 3) the newer escalation
practice does in fact result in varying degrees of treaty obligation, even
though an international minimum is guaranteed.0 2 Furthermore, the the-
oretical stand that absolutely no reservations may be attached to ILO
Conventions can be further questioned on the ground that understandings
and unilateral declarations may often be attached. Consequently, it is
here submitted that some of these provisions, though placed in a different
category and referred to as alternatives, have for all practical purposes
the same operational effect as reservations, with one very important qual-
ification. The three negotiating groups-representatives of labour, man-
agement, and sovereign states-have indicated in the main text those
vention shall have the same effect as the other provisions of the Convention.
4. Any Member which makes such a declaration may subsequently, by a new declaration,
notify the Director-General that it accepts Part II ....
57. Id. art. 5(5) (emphasis added).
58. E.g, Part I, art- 3 of the Convention Concerning Invalidity, Old Age and Survivors'
Benefits, No. 128 (1967).
59. See notes 23 and 24 supra. See also the numerous examples contained in the Appendices
to the Memo, especially No. VII, Examples of Ratifications of International Labour Con-
ventions Subject to Suspensive Conditions, Geographical Limitations and Understandings
264-82.
60. E.g., Minimum Standards Convention, art. 80(3).
61. See note 37 supra.
62. See, e.g, notes 38, 44-55 supra. See also MLO Const. art. 19(3).
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portions subject to exclusion and subsequent modification. Furthermore,
the same approach has been taken by the Council of Europe.
Despite prior agreement, the texts of final Articles contain language
indistinguishable from reservations. To illustrate, Article 17(1) and
(2) (a) of the Convention concerning the Guarding of Machinery 3 reads
like a reservation:
1. The provisions of this Convention apply to all branches of economic activity unless
the Member ratifying the Convention specifies a more limited application by a declara-
tion appended to its ratification.
2. In cases where a declaration specifying a more limited application is made-
(a) the provisions of the Convention shall be applicable as a minimum to undertak-
ings or branches of economic activity in respect of which the competent authority,
after consultation with the labour inspection services and with the most representative
organisations of employers and workers concerned, determines that machinery is ex-
tensively used; the initiative for such consultation can be taken by any such organ-
isation .... 64
Indeed, the discretion given the ratifying government is very broad;
moreover, the writer cannot distinguish the above Article from a typical
reservation. Realistically, the Convention on Guarding Machinery repre-
sents the most extreme level of flexibility in that minimum international
standards are not assured, as is the case with Conventions (e.g., Minimum
Standards Convention) setting forth mandatory standards of social se-
curity. Here, the "Member ratifying the Convention [itself] specifies a
more limited application by a declaration .... ."6 Earlier in the study
certain selected treaty articles were cited as examples containing nar-
rower specifications, and the observation was made in several footnotes
that they could be deemed to constitute reservations. 0 The question may
be asked: Is the term "declaration" to be at least partially equated with a
reservation and not exclusively with a unilateral declaration? At least a
tentative answer can be gleaned from one obvious fact; a declaration au-
thorized by the Convention itself has the authority to modify the text
because it has been agreed to by all negotiating delegates beforehand. As
such, a position very similar to that followed by the Council of Europe
has been reached. By taking a different philosophical approach, the Coun-
cil has evolved a negotiated reservation rather than an alternative to
reservations. Consequently, the writer suspects that two differing philos-
ophies have resulted in the development of somewhat similar solutions,
63. No. 119 (1963), 532 U.N.T.S. 159.
64. Id. art. 17(1) & (2)(a) (emphasis added). Article 17(2)(b) & (3) provido for the
withdrawal of such declarations; accord, Convention Concerning Wages on Board Ship, art.
5(5), note 55 supra.
65. Convention Concerning the Guarding of Machinery, art. 17(1).
66. See notes 47, 57, 60 & 64 supra. Cf. note 70 infra and the examples cited therein,
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as will be discussed more fully in the conclusions to this article. For the
present, however, the important factor is to note that the above men-
tioned treaty texts are capable of "changing or stating more precisely the
legal effect of the agreement," 67 which language is a reservation in the
opinion of the American Law Institute.
D. Understandings Short of Reservations
Although typical international type reservations are prohibited, the
practice of attaching understandings and "interpretative" declarations
does not draw objection, provided that the convention's text is not qual-
ified. The ILO accepts this definition" because these statements are dis-
tinguishable from reservations. 9 The problem is further complicated by
the fact that the term "declaration" can be used in several different con-
texts. In some instances understandings-attached by legislative bodies
at ratification-are stated in terms equivalent to reservations."0
67. Restatement § 127. See also id. comment (b) and the definition by Harvard Research
found in note 17 supra.
68. Memo to League 884. See Restatement §§ 138 & 140.
69. "In a few cases Members have, when ratifying, placed on record their understand-
ing of the meaning to be attached to a particular provision of a convention, generally
specifying that in so stating their understanding of the position they are not to be regarded
as making a reservation; no question has arisen hitherto in regard to the effect of such
understandings. In certain cases of this kind there is dearly no problem. Thus a requirement
by a legislative body that the executive shall satisfy itself of certain things, by enquiry from
other States or from an international organization or otherwise, before communicating an
instrument of ratification, or shall exercise in a certain manner a discretion left to national
competent authorities by a convention, are not reservations and will not make it impossible
to register the ratification... .They do not qualify the fact that in no case has a ratifica-
tion been registered subject to a substantive reservation." Memo 234.
70. Appendix VII to Memo, item III, Examples of ratifications subject to understandings
which have not been regarded as constituting reservations. Id. at 272-82.
In the ratification by Great Britain to the Convention Concerning Seamen's Articles of
Agreement, No. 22 (1926), 38 U.N.T.S. 295, an understanding was attached to the effect
that British law satisfied the requirements of the Treaty. Similarly, India took the position
that its internal law satisfied this Convention. Memo 272-75.
Australia attached an understanding to the effect that its arbitration court, rather than
legislation, would give effect to the Convention Concerning Hours of Work on Board Ship
and Manning, No. 57 (1936). See the discussion of Australian law in Memo 276. Such
observations were accepted by the Undersecretary-General on the ground that it was an
understanding and not a reservation. "His Majesty's Government take the view that the
law and/or practice in Australia outlined above provides all the protection to seamen that
the Convention contemplates . .. on the understanding that such law and/or practice is
regarded as specifying ... the requirements of the said articles." Memo 276.
The above understanding was accepted by the Undersecretary-General on the ground that
it was an understanding and not a reservation. "The terms of your letter have been commupj-
cated to the Director of the International Labour Office who has drawn my attention to
the fact that if the understanding stated in your letter were to be regarded as constituting
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The most striking example of an alleged understanding-recognized as
such by ILO-was attached by the United States Senate and "made part
of [such] ratification' 1 of five maritime conventions. 2 To quote the lan-
guage of the Senate, that legislative body "did advise and consent to the
ratification of the said draft Convention... subject to the following under-
standings to be made part of such ratification.'7  Furthermore, the Senate
attached a reservation as to the Philippine Islands and the Panama Canal
Zone in the following terms: "The provisions of this Convention shall
apply to all territory over which the United States exercises jurisdiction,
except the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands
and the Panama Canal Zone, with respect to which this Government re-
serves its decision.7
4
Clearly, the above language limits the scope of the treaty, with the
result that it seems unrealistic to classify this statement as an understand-
ing for the reason that even the term "reserves" is used by the Senate.
Subsequently President Roosevelt ratified the convention. "[I]n pursu-
ance of the aforesaid advice and consent of the Senate [I] ratify and
confirm the same and every article and clause thereof, subject to the un-
derstandings hereinabove recited and made part of this ratification."7 The
a reservation, the doctrine approved by the Committee of Experts on the Progressive
Codification of International Law, in a report accepted by the Council on 17 June, 1927,
to the effect that the reservations to international labour conventions are inadmissible,
would be applicable to the present case. It is presumed, however, that the Government of
the Commonwealth of Australia, which has communicated to the Secretariat an instrument
of ratification in unqualified terms, has no intention of purporting to ratify subject to a
reservation, but is merely drawing attention to the law and/or practice in Australia, which
it understands to be in conformity with the requirements of the Convention." Memo 278.
71. See Memo, app. VII, item III, at 281. Cf. the statement of ILO note 68 supra.
72. Memo 278-82.
73. Id. at 280 (emphasis added). The Convention to which understandings were attached
was the Convention Concerning Masters and Officers. The understandings attached by the
United States read as follows:
"(1) The United States Government understands and construes the words 'vessels regis-
tered in a territory' appearing in this Convention to include all the vessels of the United
States as defined under the laws of the United States.
(2) The United States Government understands and construes the words 'maritime navi-
gation' appearing in this Convention to mean navigation on the high seas only.
(3) Nothing in this Convention shall be so construed as to prevent the authorities of the
United States from making such inspection of any vessel referred to in Article V, paragraph 3,
within the jurisdiction of the United States, as may be necessary to determine that there
has been a compliance with the terms of this Convention, or to prevent such authorities
from withholding clearance to any vessel which they find has not complied with the pro-
visions of this Convention until such time as any such deficiency shall be corrected." Id.
at 281.
74. Id. at 281-82 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
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intent of the Senate's consent has been given greater clarification by the
President's ratification, and the writer concludes that the United States has
attached a reservation and not an understanding to the five maritime
Conventions. We can only speculate concerning the reason for the inaction
of the Director-General of the ILO. Perhaps it was felt expedient to per-
mit the United States to ratify at least five ILO Conventions so as not to
completely exclude United States' participation at a time when our coun-
try was not even a member of the League." Further, our Government had
not previously ratified7 7 any significant ILO conventions and in fact, the
United States did not even join the ILO until 1934. Hence, it is con-
ceivable that the same standards used as a basis for rejecting the pro-
posed reservations of Poland, India, and Cuba were not applied. It
would appear that the designation "understanding" was not questioned
by the Depositary on the theory that a dispute would not subsequently
arise.
The writer believes that the United States attached a reservation be-
cause the text had been qualified by a unilateral declaration at the time
of ratification. The language contained in the Senate's acceptance and
the President's ratification is clearly that of a reservation and not an un-
derstanding,78 for the understanding is "made part of this ratification.'
E. Recommendation As to ILO Practice
It would be well for ILO, especially the Director-General and his
Office, to reexamine the "devices" being used as "alternatives" to reser-
vations, primarily because a significant number of the more recent Con-
ventions employ provisions that appear to constitute reservations. At the
very least they have the same operational effect as the traditional reserva-
tion. The problem is further complicated by the fact that understandings
and interpretative declarations are permitted, without a clear boundary
having first been established between the "reservations," as contrasted
with declarations short of reservations (as opposed to declarations pre-
viously specified as acceptable within the text). Therefore, it may be
76. "The various ratifications were registered by the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations on 29 October, 1938." Id. at 282.
77. To date, only seven ILO Conventions have been ratified by the United States. On
October 6, 1970, the House of Representatives voted to cut off the United States contribution
to ILO for the first half of 1971. Although the United States will provide no funds for the
first part of 1971, it will retain its vote for two years. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1970, at 15,
col. 1-2.
78. Cf. the later statement of Senate practice in Japanese Peace Treaty, Senate Memo-




suggested that the ILO has reached such a very advanced stage of legal
maturity (constituting in fact a distinct global legal system) that greater
emphasis needs to be placed on codification rather than ILO Common
Law.80 The most recent statement of basic philosophy prohibiting reser-
vations was set forth at the time of the Genocide Case. However, con-
siderable development in the unique ILO legal system has taken place
since the last major pronouncement in the early 1950's. The writer under-
standably wonders if the conventions promulgated during the last twenty
years have departed from the strict rule.
Other institutions, especially the United Nations, are reexamining the
whole area. In a similar fashion, states are reconsidering their national
standards as to the adoption of both bilateral and multilateral treaties,
with considerable help from their academic communities. Consequently,
greater clarification of ILO practice is highly desirable. More specif-
ically, it may also be suggested that a further official pronouncement
would be helpful in view of the .practice of "negotiated reservations"
being perfected by the seventeen-member Council of Europe.
80. See C. Jenks, The International Protection of Trade Union Freedom 542-47 (1957).
